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THE STATE 
vs. 
REBECCA M. 
In The 
SUPREME COURT 
Of The 
STATE OF UTAH 
OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent,) 
) 
) 
) 
JIMENEZ, ) 
) 
Defendant-A22ellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT JIMENEZ 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Civil No. 
43669 
The appellant, Rebecca M. Jim~nez, 
appeals from the Judgment of the lower Court 
convicting her of second degree murder, and 
the Tria 1 Court's denia 1 of motions to suppress 
and for a new tria 1. 
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DEPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
I I 
. A~pellant was charged by inforrr~ t 
with the crime of murder in the second de I , 
A 11 I !I' ppe ants counsel moved to suppress a~ 1 ~ 
all statements made by the Defendant at he:, c 
interrogation. The Court denied Defendant': 1 
motion. The Defendant was tried by jury f; t 
the crime of second degree murder. The Jul 
returned a verdict of guilty and Defendant 
moved for a new trial. The motion was deq 
and Defendant was sentenced to the Utah Stt 
Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests that this Cou~ 
reverse. an~ vacate the lower Court's Judgrn1 
of conviction of second degree murder. 
1
. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
About midnight January 14, 1960,i 
Defendant, a middle aged, nearly illiterati 
woman of Mexican decent, was taken from he: 
I 
home in the company of police officers to;; 
Detective Bureau Office of the Salt La~~ t 
Police Department. There, this sleepless,, 8 
visibly upset Defendant was questioned a 
intermittently be severa 1 police officers, a 
during a period lasting until about 4:00A:1 ~ 
As a result of this interrogation the ~~ 
made statements both exculpatory and incr~ 
ing that were subsequently used in her sec: d 
degree murder trial in September, 1966. 
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The interrogating,officers told the 
I Defendant that she had a right to counsel, that 
tr~\ her interrogators were police officers, that 
ei1 she did not have to give a statement and that 
y~ anything she might say in that statement 
he:, could be used against her, (R 81, 82). Her 
nt'; Interrogators read to her a form, then in use 
f: by the Salt Lake City Police Department: 
Jul 
nt. 
eq 
Stt 
"I, hereby 
freely and voluntarily make the 
following statements to 
and who have identified 
themselves as officers of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department. I 
was promptly advised that I did 
not have to make a statement 
and that anything I s~id could be 
used against me in a Court of Law. 
I was also informed that I could 
consult with or obtain the 
services of an attorney if I 
),: desired. No threats, promises, 
itJ or duress were used." (R 7 5) 
J :: During the course of the interrogation 
~; the Defendant was not permitted to see her 
;,, son-in.:..law, though she requested to do so, was 
asked to take a lie detector test, but declined 
1, and was kept awake for a substantia 1 period 
A.i of time, though her interroga t'ors knew she 
:er: had had little sleep the night before. 
!C: Prior to the commencing of trial 
~funse counsel moved to suppress all written 
-4-
and oral statements made by the accused 
00
.:
1 
c 
grounds that such statements were taken i 
1
1 
[ 
violation of the accused rights as secure~' t 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment'; t 
the United States Constitution and Article:· t 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. The tr c 
Court denied this mot ion. (R 55) ~ f 
ARGUEMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS COMPELLED TO INCRillJ 
HERSELF. The record of, ~he hearing on the~ C 
to suppress clearly indicates that the Defenl a 
was the subject of questioning initiated by' C 
law enforcement officers after being deprivei t 
of her freedom of action in a "significantwj t 
that the incommunicado interrogation in a .h 
police dominated atomsphere, resulting in I'' 
incriminating statements, and that these ' ( 
statements were made by the Defendant withou: D 
a full warning of her rights under Art."l :r 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution as well! t 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Unitea 1 
! 1 States Constitution. 
i 
Officer Melvin W. Shields testifk, f 
at the hearing on the motion to suppress ~~ ~ 
the Defendant was questioned by a least thre' 
different officers on three separate occassil f 
· 1 s during a period lasting from midnight untl 0 
about 4: 00 A .M. During the first period of, , 
interrogation Officer Elton, Officer CahoonJ ~ 
' h 
0 
r 
1 
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.: officer Shields were present. (R 66) The ~ 1~ Defendant was advised in substartce "of her right 
J' to remain silent and (that) she had a right 
~~to consult with an attorney, that if she wished 
, 'to discuss the matter, anything she might say· 
-S d • II 
tr could be use in Court. (R 67) During this 
~period of interrogation the Defendant reported 
seeing a man with a crippled arm leave by way 
of the back door as she came down stairs. The 
I 
Defendant was later confronted with this 
story at her tria 1 in September, 1966. (R 363) 
00 During the second period of interrogation 
:~Officer Elton, Officer Wesley, Officer Shields 
:enl and Officer Cahoon were present. Officer 
~·~hoon again in substance advised her that any-
.vei thing she said could be held against her, 
:wj that they wanted the truth of exactly what 
~ppened, that she could consult with an attorney, 
j "basically the same thing he explained before." . 
' (R 82) During this phase of interrogation the 
1
ou: Defendant indicated that Frank Barrio was 
1 responsible for the stabbing. She described 
ij the murder weapon, told the officers the 
~~cation of the weapon, and identified it. 
! This too was admitted into evidence at trial 
in September, 1966. (R 366) During this 
le\ period of time the Defendant requested to 
hai
1 
see her son-in-law. Her request was refused. 
~ ~r interrogators confronted her with the 
sil possibility of taking a lie de·tector test which 
1 she declined: Thereafter the Defendant broke 
f down. After telling two sepa:i;ate and conflicting 
nJ stories, and being confronted with a lie 
detector after being denied her request to see 
, hefr.son-in-law (R 83); after seve;-al hours 
0 interrogation by a team of officers (R 82), 
-6-
a sleepless (R 83) Defendant admits her g:.\ 
I I U,~ 
I can fool you but I can't fool God. 11 • " tt 
I stabbed Manuel." 'I cc 
I ri 
The statements made by the accuse(; Cc 
the police during this prolonged period of ~ 
interrogation were admitted in evidence dur;1 ti 
her trial in September, 1966, (R 365,366, &: be 
and along with other evidence formed the ba~ 1 ~ 
of a jury verdict of guilty in this matter.'1 Mi 
ti 
At the time this matter went to trial 1 wa 
Defendant was entitled to the full measure~. pr 
rights incident to the recently expanded an 
priviledge against self' incrimination. ~in 
vs. New Jersey, 384 US 19, 16 Led. 2d 882 (il vs 
2n 
n We hold that Escobedo affects 
only those cases in which the 
trial began after June 22, 1964, 1 · 
the date of that decision. We 
hold further that Miranda 
applies only to cases in which . 
the tria 1 began after the date 
f d . . k " o our ecision a wee ago. 
(that date being June 13, 1966). 
emphasis added. 
This expanded protection of the Fil 
Amendment requires that once the process of 
custodial interrogation has commenced that 
the Defendant is entitled to certain protect: 
and that he must be fully advised of these. 
Constitutional rights. State vs. Rug~' 
19 Utah 2nd 216 (1967). These rights are: 
-7-
,U~~ • 
·,the right to remain silent; :the right to have 
'I counsel present during the interrogation; the 
, right if unable to afford counse 1, to. have 
· Court appointed counsel present during the 
Se(I • • 
f interroga ti.on; and the knowledge that informa-
U '• tion solicited during the interrogation may r,, • 
&, be used against you in a Court of law. Miranda 
~vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 16 LEd 2nd 694 (1966). 
r.'1 Miranda mandates that absent of clear communca-
, tion of these rights, and an intelligent 
11 waiver of them, any statements that are the 
e~ product of custodial interrogation are compelled 
and thus violate the priviledge against self 
~incrimination and must be suppressed. People 
(ii vs. Bryant, 87 Ill. App. 2nd 253, 231 N.E. 
~d 4: . 
"It seems to us that Miranda 
has gone the full distance. The 
admissibility of a confession 
or any other statement is not 
dependent upon whether it 
was induced by physical violence, 
psychological pressures, 
misrepresentations, promises of 
leniency, threats, or any other 
conduct calculated to taint 
or undermine the exercise of a 
free will. Freedom from these 
things no longer ipso ~acto 
permits the State to use such 
statements in evidence against 
the Defendant. More is required. 
These requirements Miranda has 
-8-
specified. These requirements 
we must follow. These require-
ments must be made known to a 
suspect before any statement 
arising out of an in-custody 
interrogation is admissible 
against him. It is then his 
choice to exercise his constitut-
ional privilege against self-
incrimination or to waive that 
privilege, if he elects to do so. 
That choice was not accorded the 
Defendant in this case, albeit 
unwittingly. Such a rule of 
criminal procee9ure in no sense 
precludes confes~ions or state-
ments by a Defendant in custody 
when freely, willingly and under· 
standingly made." 
The standard used to evaluate the interrogatl 
in compliance with the constitution is stric 
unyielding. Ritualistic formula will not 
suffice. The presumption is that the Deh~ 
who has not been completely informed of his 1 
rights is ignorant of them. U. S. vs. !ill 
261 F Supp. 442 (DC Del. 1966). Miranda sa1·1 
" . Procedura 1 safeguards must 
be employed to protect the 
privilege, and unless other fully 
effective means are adopted to 
notify the person of his righ~ 
of silence and to assure that the 
exercise of his right will be 
-9-
scrupulously honore~ the follow-
ing measures are required. He 
must be warned prior to any 
questioning that he has the 
right to remain silent, that 
anything he says can be used 
against him in a Court of law, 
that he has the right to the 
presence of an attorney, and 
that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed 
for him prior to any questioning 
if he so desires. Opportunity 
to exercise these rights must 
be afforded to him throughout 
the interrogation. After 
such warnings have been given, 
and such opportunity afforded 
him, the individual may knowingly 
and intelligently waive these 
rights and agree to answer 
questions or make a statement. 
But unless and until such 
warning and waiver are demonstrated 
by the prosecution at trial, 
no evidence obtained as a result 
of the interrogation can be used 
against him." 384 U. S. at 478 
86 S. Ct. at 1630. (Emphasis 
added.)' 
In this light it is necessary to 
, critically view the warnings given to the 
~efendant prior to any interrogation. Her 
1 
interrogators warned her as follows: 
. . 
-10-. 
Record 67 - Officer Melvin W. Shields Test[. 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Record 69 
Question: 
Answer~ 
Ques"tion: 
Answer: 
Record 75 
Question: 
Can you tell us what in substan
1 
he said? 
He advised her of her right to:, 
silent and she had a right to c~· 
s u 1 t with an attorney , that if , 
wished to discuss the matter, a: 
thing she might say could be us( 
in Court. 
Anything else? 
No, not that I re ca 11, no, sir. 
I' 11 ask you if prior to talkin6. 
her you advised her to any righl; 
We did I 
And will you tell us what was sai 
and by whom? · 
We had a mimeograph form which in 
that we were police officers, we, 
showed her our identification. 1 
explained to her that she Hadili 
right to remain silent. She haal 
right to consult with an attorn€' 
before making any statements, an~ 
that if she waived these rights 
thing she might say could be u~ 
Court. 
Now I will show you a form that 
' . ti 
filled out but only the type~1 
portion, Salt Lake City, Utah,~: 
Answer: 
-11-
a line under it, "I, 
-:---------------~ hereby freely and voluntarily 
make the following statements to 
and 
--------------~ ~--------------~ who have identified themselves as 
officers of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department. I was promptly advised 
that I did not have to make a state-
ment and that anything I said could 
be used against me in a Court of law. 
I was also informed that I could 
consult with or obtain the services 
of an attorney if I desired. No 
threats, promises, or duress were 
used." And them two lines under-
neath - - Was that the statement 
that you read to her and explained 
to her? 
Yes, 
Officer Glen Cahoon testified at the hearing that 
as to warnings given the Defendant as follows: 
Record 81 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
So what did you advise her of? 
I advised her that she had a right 
to counsel that because we are 
police officers she did not have to 
give a statement to us. She was 
told that what she might say in that 
statement could be used against her· 
in a Court of law. 
Anything else? 
Nothing. 
Record 82 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
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And what did you say? 
1
1 
~ 
I told her that anything she sail 
1 
would be held against her, that)~1 
wanted to get the truth of exact1 
what happened and that she coo~ 
her attorney present during thi:I 
and that these were her rights:; 
I explained to her that theseJ 
rights that were explained to~ 
before. :1 
And did you advise her of this i~ 
thing? 
Yes, at that time she was given1t 
I 
of these forms and the form was 
explained t~·her. 
And what did she say? 
She stated that she couldn't rea~ 
as I recall, and it was read to~~ 
and she stated that she understo,, 
everything that was on the form. 
Conspicuously missing from each of these war~ 
is the right of the Defendant to have c'rnnsel 
appointed if she were unable to afford counsi·) 
and to have this appointed counsel present 
during the period of interrogation. 
The basis of Miranda is that withou: 
proper safeguards the process of custodial 
1 
interrogation contains inherently compelling·
1 
pressures which work to undermine an indivia" 
will. Any assessment of knowledge of the me~) 
competencies of a Defendant are purely specul 
It is necessary that the Defendant be in~~ 
' l 
-13-
iclear and unequivocal terms of his right to 
1 remain silent and of his right to have counsel 
sa1ji present during any interrogation if the Defendant 
at desires to protect his privilege. Miranda says: 
?Il. 
I 
lS ·. 
hou: 
"In order to fully apprise a 
person interrogated of the 
extent of his rights under this 
system the~ it is necessary to 
warn him not only that he has the 
right to consult with an attorney, 
but also that if he is a indigent 
an attorney will be appointed 
to represent him. Without this 
additional warning, the 
adminition of right to consult 
with counsel will often be under-
stood as meaning only that he 
can consult with an attorney if 
he has one or has the funds to 
obtain one. The right of counsel 
would be hollow if not couched 
in terms that would convey to 
the indigent the person most 
subject to interrogation - the 
knowledge that he too has the 
right to have counsel present. 
As with the warnings of the right 
to remain silent and of the 
general.right to counsel, only 
be effective and' express explana-
tion to the indigent position 
to exercise it. 11 384 US at 473 
nni~ The Defendant was not fully advised of 
· her rights. All the pressures of custodial 
-14-
lf 
! 
interrogation played on the Defendant. The 
threat of a lie detector test, the refusal u 
the police to allow her even to see her son· 
law all added to the pressures compelling Ui 
Defendant to speak could have been allev~~ 
if an attorney were present. The Defendant! 
not informed that counsel would be appointeG! 
and that such appointed counsel could be pn1 
during this period of interrogation. The 1e 
Defendant had the right to remain silent, Dt 
ant had the right to have an appointed atto 
present to relieve some of the pressures. ~ 
the Defendant was compelled to speak and nevlr 
afforded the full measure of her rights to 
protect her priviledge. 
POINT II 
NONCOMPLIANCE OF ANY OF THE MIRANDA WARNING~;h 
MAKES STATEMENTS OBTAIN BY POLICE DURING cm~ 
OF INTERROGATION INADMISSIBEL AND ADMISSION 
REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
. Ii 
In Chapman vs. State of California, 386 U. 
17 L.ed 2nd 705. The Supreme Court held ili: 
there were many Federal Constitutional erro 
viewed in a particular case that were so ~· 
and insignificant that they may be, consist 
with the Federal Constitution, deemed a ha 
error. The introduction of a statement mad 
accused be fore he was advised of a 11 his co 
iona 1 rights is contrary to the decision o'. 
Court in Miranda vs. Arizona and thus ra1 
a Federal Constitutional error. State 
Courts have viewed a violation 
-15-
If Miranda as grounds for autorna tic reversa 1. 
! 
he "We hold that failure to advise 
l~ the appellant of his Miranda 
~n· warnings prior to interrogation 
~ necessitates a reversal of his 
3tei conviction ... 11 Hunt vs. State, 
nti 2 Md. App. 443, 234 A. 2nd (1967). 
teGr 
PIEi The opinion of the Court in Miranda 
1ets out its own reasons why errors respecting 
Dttatements made (in violation thereof) are 
to admissible and under Miranda are grounds to 
~ tomatically vacate a conviction obtained at 
nevlria 1. 
0 
The Annotation at 10 ALR 2nd 1054, 
~~ge 1063 analysis the reasoning: 
I 
1. "The Court repeatedly referred to· 
.NG~he requisite warnings as an "absolute" prere-
Gm~isite to interrogation, 
.ON 
2. The requirement of warnings to be 
liven by the police before in-custody interro-
) U. tion of a suspect is described as fundamental 
th'ith respect to the priviledge against self-
=ro ncrimination ar:id not simply a preliminary ritual 
existing methods of interrogation, 
3. Even though not involuntary in 
aditional terms, a confession is considered 
%luntary where it is ibtained by a law 
forcement officer by way of incommunicado 
terrogation, in an environment created for no 
rpose other than to subjugate the individual 
-16-
to the will of his examiner, 
4. A Defendant 1 s constitutional 
are held violated if his conviction, in a 
Federa 1 or State Court, is based in whole 
in ~art on an involuntary confession, reg
1 
of its truth or falsity, and even if ther
1 
ample evidence aside from the confessioo 
support the conviction, 
5. Whether his conviction was in 
Federa 1 or a State Court, a Defendant may 
a post conviction hearing based on the al 
involuntary character of his confession, 
he meets the procedural requirements." 
Some Courts have at tempted to d 
a distinction and apply the harm error an 
in Miranda cases. If a statement amounts 
confession, the admission into evidence 1 
confession requires automatic reversal. 
statement amounts to an admission or excu 
statement) these Cm1rts ap~lv the hai::-inl'es 
rules. (See State vs. Masato Karumai, 
592, 126 P2d 104 7 ( 1942), where confessio1 
and admissions are distinguished) This 
distinction disregards the words of the C1 
The opinion expressly included within its 
statements both exculpatory and inculpatol 
Miranda says: 
"No distinction can be drawn 
between statements which are 
direct confessions and state-
ments which amount to admissions 
of part or all of an offense. 
The privilege against self 
-17-
incrimination protects the 
individual from being compelled 
to incriminate himself in any 
manner; it does not distinguish 
degrees of incrimination." 
This distinction also disregards the 
{act that admissions and exculpatory statements 
(~y well be as unreliable as compelled confessions. 
The Miranda opinion stresses that any statement 
a~itted into evidence inviolation of rights 
~rticulated there is inherently coerced and 
ltherefore unreliable . 
. ti 
It' Along with the fact that the Defendant 
was not informed of her rights under Miranda 
iliere is some basis in the record to infer that 
,' 
:iithe statements made by the Defendant were compelled 
111.mder circumstances of extreme physical 
~ressures. The circumstances giving rise to ,. 
1!the compelling pressures are: (1) at the time 
.!bf the interrogation the interrogating officers 
·ftnew that she had had little or no sleep the 
1 hight before (R 84), yet they continued to 
~nterrogate her well into the early hours of 
11the morning. (2) During the course of this 
interrogation she requested to see her son-in-law, 
mwho at the time was in the next room. (R 83) She 
it.las not permitted to see him. (3) The Defendant 
1~as confronted with the possible use of a 
lie detector test. Officer Cahoon indicates 
that he discussed the possibility 0£ having 
the Defendant take a lie detector test during 
the later portion of the second interrogation· 
The Defendant stated that she was an extremely 
-
-18-
nervious type indi vidua 1 and probably wouL 
make a good subject for the polygraph. Al 
resulting in the Defendant crying out duri; 
the last interrogation, ... I can fooly·· 
I v 
but I couldn t fool God ... I stabbed &m 
The rights of the Defendant that; 
violated during her interrogation were not 
unimportant and insignificant. Failure to 
suppress these statements made by the Defer.: 
and allowing their admission at trial was 
Constitutional error. It makes no differefi\ 
whether such statements were confessionsm 
merely admissions. They are unreliable bee;. 
they were made by an uni, formed Defendant an: 
because they were compelled. These admissL 
into evidence at trial requires automatic 
reversal of the appellant's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was compelled to incrim; 
herself through psychologica 1 pressures ana t 
because of the absence of the safegards· of:~ 
priviledge. Appellant was not informed of 
her right to appointed counsel nor that ~t 
appointed counsel could be present duringt 
interrogation. Failure of the trial Court: 
suppress thes~ statements was Constitutiona 
error. These statements were both the pr~ 
of compulsion and the result of no safe~~ 
in the presence of an attorney. These s~~ 
were inherently unreliable because of the 
lack of procedura 1 sa fegards and unreliable 
because they were compelled by pressures . 
• 
i). Their admission requires automatic reversal 
\l; of the appellant's conviction. 
:fr 
y~ 
1t; 
It 
:o 
:er .. 
Respectfully submitted, • 
F. Robert Reeder 
Attorney for Petitioner-
· Appellant 
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Salt Lake.City, Utah 
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